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Abstract. When trying to do justice to the discourse of a certain religion it 
is oft en implicitly assumed that one’s analysis should accord with and respect 
the opinions held by the people preaching and practicing that religion. One 
reason for this assumption may be the acceptance of a more general thesis, that 
adherents of a given religious tradition cannot fail to know the proper content 
and function of the language and concepts constitutive of it. In this article, the 
viability of this thesis is explored through an investigation of the extent to which 
people belonging to a certain religion may be in error about what they mean. 
I assume that people, if mistaken, are wrong according to a standard which is 
mind-dependent enough for them to be committed and accountable to it but, 
at the same time, mind-independent enough for them to be mistaken about it. 
I try to account for this delicate balance by identifying the standard with a social 
norm, a mind-independent object of worship or people’s intuitive judgement. 
I. INTRODUCTION
To account for the content and purpose of religious language and concepts 
is an old and diffi  cult task. Many have taken on themselves to present 
a proper account, but no one seems to have come up with a proposal 
which all or most people agree on. Th e objective of the following article 
is not to present such an account, but to examine some issues that need 
to be settled before any such account can be properly assessed. Most 
basically, how does one defi ne and measure the accuracy of such an 
account? What facts should be considered and respected if one wishes to 
do justice to the language and concepts of a certain religious tradition? 
Must one’s account, for instance, be accepted by the religious people 
who belong to the tradition? Or can one rather assume this to be less 
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important, perhaps by thinking that the people may be mistaken about 
the content or function of the discourse constitutive of the religion they 
themselves preach and practice?1 If the latter, to what extent or in what 
sense may they be thought to be mistaken? In the following, a sequence of 
possible responses to this question is considered. Each response, except 
for the initial one, is presented as a development of the previous one. 
I proceed as follows: In the next section, I attend to one specifi c 
aspect of D. Z. Phillips’ position on how to analyse the content and 
function of religious language. In connection to this aspect, I put 
forward a distinction between ‘soft ’ and ‘strong’ contextualism. Strong 
contextualism is the thesis that only people who belong to and practice 
a certain tradition or system, like a religious one, can make sense of the 
language and concepts employed within it; people outside the system 
or tradition cannot. Soft  contextualism is the thesis that people who 
belong to and practice a certain system or tradition cannot be mistaken 
about the function and content of the concepts and language constitutive 
of it. Th e soft  thesis states that people who use a certain language and 
certain concepts regularly and with serious intent know the proper 
function and content of these. Th e second of the two theses is the central 
focus of the present article, which mainly consists of an investigation 
of the viability of the thesis and of what reason one may have to adjust 
or reject it. Section III presents a preparatory analysis of what would 
constitute a justifi ed rejection or qualifi cation of the thesis, which brings 
forward the notion of a ‘conceptual mistake.’ In section IV I propose 
an ‘anti-individualistic’ construal of the thesis, which, when applied to 
the religious context, amounts to the idea that at least some members 
of a religious community know the proper function and content of 
the religious concepts and language used by most or all its members. 
In section V I examine the possibility of going beyond this proposal by 
exploring to what extent a whole community of religious people can be 
mistaken about what they mean in the sense of being mistaken about 
the nature of a mind-independent object of worship while yet referring 
determinately to it. In the last section, I continue to pursue this question 
1 By ‘function’ I mean for instance if the use of language is descriptive, prescriptive 
and so on. Th e question about the nature of the language, e.g. whether it is metaphorical 
or not, can also be tied to this functional aspect.
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by exploring in what sense people within the community can possess 
and employ a ‘sortal’ for the object of worship, which is required to refer 
to it, while being mistaken about the proper content of this sortal. 
II. SOFT AND STRONG CONTEXTUALISM
People who study and analyse religious discourse naturally seek to do 
justice to its content and purpose. It is however not evident what it is 
to account for this aspect of religion or how it should be done. Th is 
circumstance may be exemplifi ed by attending to what is oft en called 
a ‘Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion’ and the discussion it has aroused. 
One distinguishing and well-known feature of this Wittgensteinian 
position is the claim that many religious people and scholars have failed 
to appreciate what religion and God-talk are all about. Th ey have missed 
the distinctiveness of religious concepts and have not realized that the 
content and function of these are not the same as for concepts used in 
diff erent, non-religious, contexts. D. Z. Phillips, as is well known, was 
one who persistently argued this to be the case.2
A common response to Phillips’ charge is that, to the extent that such 
an interpretive mistake has been made, it is rather Phillips and people 
accepting his account who are the ones guilty of it. Th ey are the ones 
who misrepresent the content and purpose of religious language and 
concepts. To back this up, one usually appeals to the fact that many 
religious devotees do not appear to feel quite at home with Phillips’ 
account of what they mean. Th is, it is argued, must defi nitely rule out 
Phillips’ analysis. For instance, not so long ago John Hick wrote: 
In the end, Phillips was implying that religious people don’t mean what 
they say, but that he knows diff erently and better than them what they must 
mean. Th is constitutes a fundamental fl aw in his philosophy of religion: 
he both appealed to and yet contradicted the use of religious language by 
devout religious people. He based his case on the actual use of religious 
2 For a good presentation of this circumstance, see Richard Messer, Does God’s 
Existence Need Proof? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 49-50. For a more recent and 
very thorough exposition of Phillips’ approach, see P. F. Bloemendaal, Grammars of Faith: 
a Critical Evaluation of D. Z. Phillips’s Philosophy of Religion (Leuven: Peeters, 2006). 
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language by religious people, within their form of life, but rejected their own 
understanding of what they are doing.3
According to Hick, one cannot do justice to a religious language while 
disqualifying the account of it presented by people seriously engaged in it. 
Th is is, however, precisely what Phillips, in Hick’s eyes, is doing and what 
disqualifi es his analysis. In responding to this criticism, Phillips does not 
so much object to this description of what he does as he questions what’s 
wrong with it. Phillips writes that: 
[T]he account given by a believer has no automatic philosophical warrant. It, 
too, must be conceptually faithful to the belief. If we say, ‘Who better to ask 
than the believers?’, we should refl ect on the fact that if we asked ‘thinking 
people’ to tell us what they mean by ‘thinking,’ a confused Cartesianism 
would be returned with a thumping majority. We cannot do philosophy by 
Gallup poll. Religion like, ‘thinking,’ can be the victim of widespread friendly 
fi re. 4
In doing conceptual justice to religious language one cannot then, 
according to Phillips, rest one’s case on what the people employing it are 
thinking about it because they may also be mistaken about its proper 
function or content. In reasoning like this, Phillips may be held to 
object to two theses, what I call soft  and strong contextualism. Strong 
contextualism is the idea that only people belonging to a certain religious 
tradition or community can understand the proper content and function 
of the concepts and language employed within it. People outside the 
community or tradition cannot do this to the same extent.5 Even if 
3 John Hick, “D. Z. Phillips on God and Evil,” Religious Studies 43 (2007): 440.
4 D. Z. Phillips, “Pictures of Eternity – A Reply to Mario von der Ruhr” in D. Z. 
Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion: Questions and Responses, ed. Andy F. 
Sanders (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 78. Phillips is not responding directly to the passage 
quoted from Hick.
5 As is well known, Phillips is oft en attributed this position. Mark Addis seems to 
think that Phillips is a ‘fi deist’ and then explains fi deism as the position that ‘[R]eligious 
language is intelligible only to those who participate in the religious form of life. [. . .] 
Religious language constitutes a distinct linguistic practice which non-participants in the 
form of life could not grasp and show to be incoherent or erroneous.’, see Mark Addis, 
“D. Z. Phillips’ Fideism in Wittgenstein’s Mirror” in Wittgenstein and Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Robert L. Arrington et al. (London: Routledge, 2001), 85. To the extent that 
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one is sceptical of strong contextualism, one may still accept that people 
who preach and practice a certain religion know or establish the content 
and function of the main concepts of that religion. Th at is, one may still 
fi nd it reasonable to assume that people employing a certain language 
and certain concepts regularly and seriously are in a good position to 
know the function and content of the language and the concepts, for 
how else are they, for instance, able to operate with them confi dently and 
seemingly accurately? To accept this idea is to accept the thesis of soft  
contextualism. Soft  contextualism does not entail that people “outside” 
the religion cannot come to know the proper function and content of 
the concepts and language used within it, only that people “inside” the 
religion cannot fail to. If one accepts this thesis, one may draw upon it to 
argue that a philosophical analysis of what the concepts within a certain 
religion mean should agree with and respect the opinion about this 
matter held by people belonging to that religion. Th is is one important 
motive for exploring the nature and intelligibility of soft  contextualism. 
As we have seen, when trying to do justice to religious concepts, Phillips, 
for instance, thinks that the religious people employing the concepts can 
be mistaken or ignorant about what they actually mean. It is in virtue of 
this that I regard him as an opponent, not only to strong contextualism, 
but also to soft  contextualism. 
In what follows, I will focus on soft  contextualism. Th e reason for this 
is that the principle idea of soft  contextualism has not been the subject 
of as much discussion and investigation as the principle idea of strong 
contextualism, nor has it been investigated to the degree it deserves. 
Our investigation of soft  contextualism will, however, also be relevant 
for anyone interested in, or even defending, strong contextualism. If we, 
for instance, as a result of the impending investigation, were to become 
sceptical of soft  contextualism, we would also seem to have a reason for 
doubting the intelligibility of strong contextualism. It would for instance 
be diffi  cult to maintain that only people belonging to a religious tradition 
can know the proper content of the concepts employed within it (which 
is the thesis of strong contextualism) if they can be mistaken about the 
Addis suggests that Phillips thinks that only religious people can understand the proper 
meaning of religious language, I think Addis is wrong. Apart from the fact that such an 
idea would appear to be in direct opposition to Phillips’ criticism of soft  contextualism, 
the textual evidence for thinking that this is not Phillips’ position seems quite extensive.
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content (which a rejection of soft  contextualism would imply). It has been 
helpful to consider Phillips’ position in explaining soft  contextualism. 
However, in exploring the intelligibility of this thesis, I proceed without 
focusing especially on his position as I wish to approach the matter from 
a more general perspective.
III. THE VIABILITY OF SOFT CONTEXTUALISM. 
– A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
We should begin our investigation of soft  contextualism by initially 
making clear what would motivate a rejection of it. Th at is, what would 
qualify as an instance of people being ignorant or mistaken about the 
content of the concepts and language they employ? I will propose and 
in the following work with the idea that one distinguishing feature 
of such mistakes, which I call conceptual mistakes, is that people who 
are guilty of them are mistaken according to a standard for correct 
thinking about the language and concepts they employ which they 
hold themselves committed and accountable to. Th e possibility of such 
mistakes presupposes a delicate balance. Th e standard in question 
should be objective and mind-independent enough for them to be able 
to be mistaken about it, but subjective and mind-dependent enough for 
them to be accountable and committed to it, to be what they “actually” 
mean or should mean. Before we begin to examine if people may be 
guilty of conceptual mistakes, let us attend just a bit more to why this 
is a relevant question to consider. Th e idea of a conceptual mistake, if 
sensible, can help us account for how we may criticise a religion from 
within the religion itself, by for instance claiming that certain rituals or 
beliefs are not doing justice to the standard implicit in and constitutive 
of that religion and which people, in virtue of believing in it, may be held 
committed and accountable to. For this reason, one can also draw upon 
the notion of a conceptual mistake to question a too simple distinction 
between ‘prescriptive’ and ‘descriptive’ accounts of a religious tradition. 
Accounts not directly in line with the ordinary and commonly accepted 
interpretation of a religious tradition are oft en considered prescriptive or 
revisionary ones. Th e notion of a conceptual mistake may cast doubt on 
the legitimacy of this tendency. 
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Let me also make clear what seems to be the main problem in establishing 
a conceptual mistake: Th e fact that people usually seem to be committed 
to a standard by knowing it. If this is true, one can surely wonder how 
people can be committed to a standard while being mistaken about it. We 
may phrase the problem with regard to concepts: To possess a concept is 
oft en equated with knowing how one should employ it. In showing that 
people can make conceptual mistakes, we thus need to show how people 
can know enough to possess and to be committed to a certain concept 
while, at the same time, know too little to have infallible knowledge about 
its proper function and content. 
IV. A SOCIAL MODIFICATION OF SOFT CONTEXTUALISM
How, then, can one commit a conceptual mistake? One initial possibility 
would be to accept the anti-individualistic proposal that a person can 
possess a concept, even when having a partly mistaken or incomplete 
account of it, in virtue of belonging to a community of people in which 
at least someone has a complete and accurate account of it. One well-
known defender of this proposal is Tyler Burge, who argues that people 
should be thought to possess the common concept of, for example, 
a contract even when, for instance, thinking that an oral agreement does 
not constitute a binding contract. If many enough of the beliefs they have 
about the concept of a contract are accurate, they should be thought to 
possess our ordinary concept of it rather than a personal and deviant 
one. It would then also be correct to describe what they mean and what 
beliefs and thoughts they have by relying on the ordinary concept. It 
would for example be correct to state that ‘Susan thinks that she just 
signed a contract,’ even if her idea of a contract is incorrect. Of course, 
what is true for the concept of a contract is also held to be true for many 
concepts.6 What concept a person has is thus not settled by and limited 
to what she has in ‘her head,’ that is, what she believes the proper content 
is. What someone has in ‘her head’ may also not settle what she can refer 
to. To consider a well-known example from Hilary Putnam, a person 
6 See Tyler Burge, “Individualism and the Mental” (1979), in Foundations of Mind, 
Philosophical Essays, vol. 2, ed. Tyler Burge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105-7. 
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can be judged to refer determinately to elms even though he does not 
know how to distinguish an elm from a beech.7 As long as the person is 
a member of a community of people in which someone else is able to tell 
them apart, he can rely on that person’s expertise.
A person can then possess a concept while being mistaken about 
its content because she may not only possess the concept in virtue of 
having an accurate or complete account of it. She can also possess the 
concept in virtue of having an accurate enough account of it and by 
being a member of a community of people in which some people have 
a full and correct account of it. What concept she has and is committed 
to thus depend on what community she belongs to. Being a member 
includes being committed and accountable to the communal norm for 
the concept, which is the same as what better informed people accept 
as the proper content for it.8 One reason for accepting this account of 
concept-possession is that it seems to do justice to our ordinary practice 
of concept-attribution and our commitment to a socially shared and 
accepted norm for thinking about the world. If we adopt this picture of 
what it is to have and employ a concept and to be committed to a standard 
for proper thinking about its content, we seem to have some reason 
for questioning soft  contextualism because according to this picture, 
people may have a concept without having a proper account of it. We 
also realise that one possible reason for assuming the correctness of soft  
contextualism from the outset is that one adopts an individualistic theory 
of language-use and concept-possession. Recall, one common argument 
for soft  contextualism is the idea that a person possesses a concept in 
virtue of knowing its content, for what else explains how he can operate 
with it? In drawing upon the social nature of language-use and concept-
possession, anti-individualism requires less from an individual user of 
a language and concepts.
7 Hilary Putnam, “Th e Meaning of “Meaning”” (1975), in Th e Twin Earth Chronicles: 
Twenty Years of Refl ection on Hilary Putnam’s “Th e Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, ed. Andrew 
Pessin et al. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 12-14. Putnam calls this ‘division of linguistic 
labor’.
8 Burge thinks that ‘Speakers commonly intend to be interpreted according to 
standards of usage that are in some respects better understood by others,’ see Tyler Burge, 
“Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 67 (2003): 684.
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Of course, an advocate of soft  contextualism may not regard anti-
individualism as an accurate explanation of concept-possession and 
may simply refuse to acknowledge it. A more interesting response, and 
one that I will focus on, is the idea that anti-individualism does not so 
much call into question the doctrine of soft  contextualism as it points 
to a sensible modifi cation of it, or maybe a qualifi cation of it assumed 
from the outset. Applying anti-individualism to, for example, a certain 
religious community would just mean that at least some people within 
the community know the proper function or content of the religious 
concepts or language used by most or all people within the community. 
As long as soft  contextualism is not construed as the thesis that everyone 
who belongs to a certain community knows the content of the concepts 
and language employed within it, anti-individualism seems compatible 
with it. And in doing justice to the content and function of the concepts 
used within a community, it is thus enough that one’s analysis is consistent 
with the opinion of some of its members, perhaps the ones considered to 
be authorities concerning what the concepts in question mean. 
We can exemplify this version of soft  contextualism by attending 
to what can be called ‘traditional theism,’ the religious worship of 
a transcendent subject, wholly or partly responsible for the creation and 
destiny of mankind. Let us assume a community of people preaching 
and practicing such theism. We may then propose that in order for soft  
contextualism to be true of such a religious community, the following 
must be true of it: (1) at least some people within it must know what they 
all mean and refer to by ‘God’ and related concepts and (2) the rest of the 
people can be less knowledgeable although competent enough to defer 
to the former group of people, in order to “mean what they mean.” Such 
a religious community may be held to exemplify a ‘communal’ or ‘social’ 
type of soft  contextualism. 
V. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A WHOLE RELIGIOUS 
COMMUNITY BEING MISTAKEN
We ended the last section by construing a version of soft  contextualism 
that defused the anti-individualistic objection to it, by making soft 
contextualism compatible with it. Is this then the end of the line? Have 
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we pushed our scepticism of soft  contextualism as far as possible or 
may we push it just a little bit further? In exploring this matter, it seems 
natural to consider the possibility of a whole community of people, and 
not just some members of it, being mistaken about what they mean. Th e 
idea is not that everyone in the community must be mistaken about 
the content of a certain concept or word; perhaps not all people within 
the community employ it. We are rather wondering if it is possible for 
people to be incorrect concerning what they mean without being wrong 
relative to the standard set by someone else in the same community. Th e 
possibility of this being the case seems to presuppose a standard that 
everyone can be committed and accountable to while yet being mistaken 
about it. How may this come about? In trying to account for this delicate 
balance, one suggestion may be that the standard for what they mean 
by a certain concept or word is a mind-independent object referred to 
by the people. In virtue of being mind-independent, it would account 
for the required distance between it and the people for the people to 
be mistaken about it. Relating this to theism, we can equate the mind-
independent object with the theistic God and suggest that people within 
the theistic community are committed to this object by referring to it. 
Th e relevant question would then be – to what extent and in what sense 
can the whole community be referentially committed to a possible God 
while having mistaken beliefs about its nature?
According to one traditional theory, religious people succeed in 
referring to God in virtue of having an identifying description of God. 
Th e description does not need to be complete but it must be correct 
and precise enough to pick out God. Without going into the details 
of this theory, which can be construed and interpreted diff erently, it 
seems to entail that the possibility for a community of people to refer 
determinately to God while being radically mistaken about God’s nature 
is rather limited, due to the fact that they refer in virtue of knowing a true 
enough description of God. Th at is, if what they hold to be true of the 
object of worship is not uniquely true, or true at all, of it, one may claim 
that they either refer to something else (the object fi tting the description) 
or nothing at all (if nothing or too much fi ts the description). Th e people 
may still be moderately mistaken about the nature of God but not to the 
extent that the identifying description of God is abandoned. We thus seem 
to have reached some conclusion regarding how mistaken a community 
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of religious people may be about what they mean. However, since this 
conclusion is relative to a certain theory on how religious people refer to 
the object of worship, one may of course wonder if this theory is the only 
game in town? Or may we adopt a diff erent theory on how people refer 
to God which does not demand that they have a correct account of the 
object of worship? 
Th e most natural option may be what is usually referred to as the 
‘causal’ theory of reference developed by and mainly associated with Saul 
Kripke, Keith Donnellan and Hilary Putnam.9 One general idea argued 
for in the name of this theory is that one does not refer to an object in 
virtue of having an accurate or identifying description of it because one 
can be held to refer successfully to it although one’s description is not 
uniquely true, or true at all, of the object. With regard to how a proper 
name refers, Kripke, for instance, thinks that the name is initially attached 
to its bearer through a naming ceremony. People not attending the event, 
most people that is, can still refer to the individual given the name in 
virtue of intending, by the name, to refer to the same person as the one 
they got the name from or “everyone else” (if they have forgotten who 
they got the name from). Th e person they got it from, or “everyone else,” 
in turn, has the same intention towards someone else and so on, creating 
a connection from the present user of the name back to the people at 
the naming ceremony. It is this link-to-link connection that usually lets 
us refer to a certain person although we may know very little about him 
or her. According to this idea, ‘Aristotle’ does not refer to the famous 
philosopher in virtue of the descriptive content associated with his name. 
Th is entails that ‘Aristotle’ would refer to the same person even if most 
of our beliefs about him turned out to be mistaken, that he, for instance, 
was not the author of On Interpretation and the Metaphysics.
More or less orthodox versions of the causal theory of reference 
have been used to account for how religious people refer to the object 
of worship. Drawing upon Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Donnellan’s criticism 
of the descriptive theory and by assuming that we can refer to an object 
by describing its causal eff ect rather than knowing its true nature, Janet 
9 See for instance Keith Donnellan, “Speaking of Nothing,” Th e Philosophical Review 
83 (1974): 3-31; Hilary Putnam, “Th e Meaning of “Meaning””; Saul Kripke, Naming and 
Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).
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Martin Soskice thinks that we can refer to God, even if we are very 
ignorant or mistaken about God’s nature. 
To employ an argument analogous to that which we have employed in the 
scientifi c case, we must claim to point to God via some eff ect and a more 
satisfactory way of doing so is to follow the more experiential lead of Aquinas 
and say that ‘God is that which is the source and cause of all there is.’ Th is 
does not demonstrate that there is a unifi ed source nor that, if there is, it 
meets any description preferred by theists. As in the scientifi c case, to be 
a realist about reference is to be a ‘fallibilist’ about knowledge of the referent. 
Speakers may refer and yet be mistaken, even quite radically mistaken, as to 
the nature of that to which they refer.10
In a similar fashion, building extensively on Kripke’s reasoning about how 
a proper name refers, William Alston argues that the referent of ‘God’ is 
picked out through a religious experience: ‘God’ refers to whatever some 
people come to face through that experience and people who have not 
had such an experience may defer to the ones who have. ‘God,’ then, does 
not refer in virtue of the descriptive content oft en associated with it. Th e 
object of the religious experience may not fi t the descriptive content. In 
fact, the content can fi t a diff erent object not experienced by the people 
using the name. Th e object experienced is nonetheless what we refer to 
by ‘God.’11 
If we accept the causal theories suggested by Soskice and Alston on 
how people can refer to God, they entail that a religious community can 
be rather mistaken about the object of worship. Th is, in turn, would mean 
that our previous conclusion concerning how mistaken people can be 
about a possible God while still referring to it, based on the descriptive 
theory, must be modifi ed. To bring out the diff erence between the two 
theories, assume that the descriptive content associated with ‘God’ 
within a certain theistic community does not apply to the entity causally 
responsible for the creation of the universe. Perhaps the property ‘all-
10 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985), 139. Soskice argues for a modifi ed version of the causal theory by thinking 
that senses of words do matter, although not in the sense usually associated with the 
descriptivist theory. See Soskice, Metaphor, 132. 
11 William Alston, “Referring to God,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 
24 (1988): 118-122. 
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knowing’ is not true of the entity. If we were to rely on a descriptive 
theory, we may then be forced to conclude that the people have not 
referred to this entity and since they have not referred to it, they cannot 
be held to be mistaken in relation to it. On a causal theory, in contrast, we 
would not be forced to draw this conclusion. On both theories, an entire 
community of religious people may be mistaken about God’s nature, but 
on the causal theory, the mistakes, it seems, can be rather big. 
If we were to accept a causal theory of reference in the context of 
God-talk, the outcome of it would not appear unimportant. It would for 
instance off er a theist the possibility to substantially change her religion 
without her changing religion because what establishes the identity or 
continuity of the theistic religion is the divine subject referred to and, 
according to the current approach, the theist can remain referentially 
committed to this subject even when radically changing her beliefs about 
its nature. More precisely, the causal theory would, for example, provide 
a feminist minded scholar or devotee the ground needed for claiming 
that a removal of the masculine gender used in much theistic God-talk 
does not change what theists have been referentially committed to all 
along. Another outcome that is interesting with regard to the matter 
of soft  contextualism is that people may not only be radically mistaken 
about the nature of what they refer to while still referring to it, but also 
about how they refer to it, for instance by incorrectly believing that some 
description of God is fi xing the reference for ‘God’ while this, in fact, is 
not so. I return to this specifi c outcome in section VI. 
One may however argue that the causal theory may fail to account 
for what a theist refers to by ‘God.’ Th e reason for this failure is that 
the information and procedure it relies on to pick out the object of 
worship is too imprecise. To exemplify this, suppose a person declared 
that God is ‘whatever was causally responsible for me having a certain 
religious experience.’ Is this account suffi  cient to make that person refer 
determinately to God? To some extent this will depend on what we 
mean by ‘refer determinately,’ but one may claim that the account ‘God 
is whatever was causally responsible. . .’ is too thin to do justice to what 
theistic people intend to refer to by ‘God.’ Th ey do not identify God with 
whatever was causally responsible for some religious experience. For this 
object to be considered God it must be a certain kind of object and not 
just any kind of object. Perhaps it must be spiritual rather than material 
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and maybe also personal. If the object does not have such features it is not 
God.12 To account for what people within the theistic community have 
referred to, we may thus have to accept that for an object to be considered 
God, it must fi t a certain category, or set of categories. Th e category or 
categories may not be unique for the object. Let us call such a category 
or set of categories a God-sortal. Th e God-sortal then determines the 
extent to which theistic people can be wrong about a possible object 
of worship while still referring determinately to it. An entity, even if 
causally responsible for a religious experience, which does not fi t the 
God-sortal, cannot be considered the proper referent – God that is.13 Of 
course, the sortal alone would not be enough to account for what theistic 
people refer to by ‘God.’ To the extent that we accept the causal theory in 
this context, the sortal should be regarded as an important complement 
to it.14 People committed to a God-sortal seem to be committed and 
accountable to something less than an identifying description of the 
object of worship, but to something more than a ‘causal description,’ like 
‘God is whatever was causally responsible for me having this religious 
experience.’ Recall, the general purpose of this whole discussion is to 
try to establish to what extent a mind-independent object of worship 
can constitute a standard according to which religious people can be 
mistaken about what they mean. Perhaps then the proper response 
to this question is: To the extent that the mind-independent object of 
12 See for instance Michael Durrant, “Reference and Critical Realism,” Modern 
Th eology 5 (1989): 139-140; See also Peter Byrne, Prolegomena to Religious Pluralism 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 45, 51 for a similar idea. 
13 We may perhaps exemplify the idea of a sortal by returning to our previous example 
with Aristotle. Although we may accept that ‘Aristotle’ would still refer to Aristotle even 
if it was discovered that he was not the author of On Interpretation or the Metaphysics, 
or perhaps any philosophical text, we would not, I think, be quite as open-minded if we 
discovered that ‘Aristotle’ was in fact the name of a cat. Th e reason for this, I suggest, is 
that a cat is not the kind of being we intend to refer to by ‘Aristotle.’ A cat does not fi t our 
sortal for ‘Aristotle.’
14 By introducing the idea of a ‘God-sortal’ I do not wish to engage in a metaphysical 
discussion about God’s nature by for instance opposing the idea that God does not belong 
to any genus. I am only attending to what people commonly hold to be essential for God, 
that is, what they think an object must be like to qualify as God and to be the object they 
have intended to refer to. Th e current suggestion, that for an object to be God it must 
be of a certain kind, is intended to capture this attitude of many religious people and 
thinkers. Of course, the precise content of the God-sortal can be discussed. 
185SOFT CONTEXTUALISM AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
worship fi ts the sortal associated with it. We thus seem to have reached 
some conclusion about just how mistaken a whole community of theistic 
people may be about what they mean. 
VI. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING MISTAKEN 
ABOUT THE GOD-SORTAL
Have we then, at last, come to the end? Have we come to a conclusion 
about the extent to which people of a theistic community can be mistaken 
about the object of worship and still refer to it? It surely appears so. 
Recall that to commit a conceptual mistake is to do wrong according to 
a standard one can be held to be committed to. If the standard is a mind-
independent object, one must be referentially committed to it and this 
appears to presuppose that the object fi ts our sortal for it. Th e sortal thus 
determines how mistaken people may be about what they mean, ‘mean’ 
in the sense of what they refer to. Still, one cannot help but wonder if it 
would be possible for people to possess and employ a God-sortal while 
being mistaken and ignorant about its true content. In this last section, 
I consider this possibility. 
To know the sortal for the object one refers to is to know what kind 
of object it is. Drawing upon this account of the sortal we can reconnect 
to the Wittgensteinian tradition, attended to in section II, and its idea of 
‘depth grammar’ since ‘grammar tells what kind of object anything is.’15 
Simplifying the concept of depth grammar somewhat, the basic idea 
seems to be that for a certain sort of object, we have a ‘grammatical rule-
book’ establishing what would be sensible to claim and think about it. 
For instance, to assert that a certain person is in a good mood is sensible, 
regardless if it is true or not since ‘being in a good mood’ is a property 
that may properly be attributed to a human being. In contrast, to declare 
that the tree outside my offi  ce has had a bad day and is looking forward 
to tomorrow is neither true nor untrue, just nonsense; a tree does not 
look forward to anything. We may connect this to Putnam’s example 
with elms attended to in section IV. A person may be held to refer to 
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), paragraph 373.
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elms even if he does not know the precise diff erence between elms and 
beeches, but if he does not even know what a tree is, what kind of object 
it is, he can be held to be too ignorant to refer to elms; he then lacks 
knowledge of the sortal/grammar for the object he intends to refer to. 
Remember, Phillips thinks that religious people can be mistaken 
about what they mean. His position is complex and heterogeneous but 
one core idea is certainly that what religious people claim and think may 
not make sense relative to the grammar for the concepts they employ and 
the objects they refer to. With regard to this, but also with regard to the 
specifi c need for a God-sortal in the case of referring to God, one may 
wonder if people can be mistaken or ignorant about the sortal or grammar 
for a certain object. Th at is, can they be mistaken and ignorant about what 
they themselves consider to be the God-sortal? For people to be mistaken 
or ignorant in this sense, they should be wrong relative to a standard they 
hold themselves committed and accountable to. As previously assumed, 
for people to be mistaken and ignorant in this sense, the standard must 
be mind-independent to some extent, in order to account for how they 
can be mistaken about it, but not too mind-independent, because that 
would make it hard to hold the people accountable and committed to it. 
We thus need to ask: Does the possibility of such mistakes extend to how 
religious people have and know a God-sortal?
One idea would be to distinguish between implicit and explicit 
knowledge of the God-sortal. In presenting this option, we can attend 
to one contemporary theory on conceptual mistakes and analysis. Frank 
Jackson thinks that when we are being presented with a “Gettier-case” 
and through this come to question our old and traditional defi nition of 
knowledge, we do not seem to conclude that we have been misapplying the 
concept of knowledge and that we need to change our use of it. Rather, we 
seem to think that the common defi nition of knowledge as ‘justifi ed true 
belief ’ does not capture what has been implicit in our actual employment 
of the concept all along. In this we have a conceptual mistake rather 
than a conceptual change because we hold ourselves committed and 
accountable to how we employ a concept rather than to how we defi ne 
it.16 According to this position, people can possess a concept by knowing 
16 Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 36, 38. 
187SOFT CONTEXTUALISM AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
how to categorize certain objects as being of a general kind. Th ey can for 
instance be able to identify certain objects as tables, although not being 
able to explicitly account for how they do it. As Christopher Peacocke 
puts it: ‘thinkers can be good at classifying cases, and bad at articulating 
the principles guiding their classifi cations.’17 People may thus be unable 
to present a defi nition of the concept of a table or what rule they follow 
in categorising tables as ‘tables.’ Th ey may of course have an idea about 
what the proper content of the concept of a table is, but, according to 
the current theory, they do not possess the concept of a table in virtue of 
believing in a certain, correct or incorrect, defi nition of it; much in the 
same sense as people, according to the causal theory of reference, do not 
refer to an object in virtue of having an accurate account of it. 
If we accept this idea about what it is to have a concept, we can draw 
upon it to argue that religious people may be employing and committed 
to a certain God-sortal, while being mistaken about its precise content. 
If we agree on this, we also have a reason for questioning the specifi c 
version of soft  contextualism previously considered, that people cannot 
use and be committed to a certain God-sortal while failing to know its 
true content. Once more we also come to challenge one general motive 
for soft  contextualism, the idea that one has to know a concept properly 
to be thought to possess and employ it, for how can one use it intelligibly 
or successfully if not by knowing its content? To the extent that such 
knowledge is thought to be explicit, it does not, in fact, seem to be 
required. We may also perhaps obtain support for Phillips’ conviction 
that one can do better justice to a certain religious concept by focusing on 
how it is used rather than on how its content and function are described 
by the religious people using it. Moreover, although we are drawing 
upon the distinction between implicit and explicit content of a concept 
to show how a person can be mistaken about the proper content of his 
own God-sortal, we may extend the distinction beyond this particular 
case to other religious concepts. We can then account for how a whole 
community of religious people can be mistaken about what they mean 
by the concepts they employ without appealing to a mind-independent 
object. Instead we can appeal to a “mind-independent” content of the 
17 Christopher Peacocke, “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality,” 
Philosophical Issues 9 (1998): 51.
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concepts, mind-independent in the sense of not being explicitly known. 
Th is may be an important outcome in that many religious concepts do 
not pick out a mind-independent object or subject in the same sense that 
the concepts of a tree, gold or God may do. 
Still, one may think that the possibility of being mistaken in the 
manner currently considered does not apply to every concept. Th is might 
be correct. As Paul Grice once remarked, it does not appear possible 
to know or have the concept of a father without knowing what a male 
parent is, although one can have and employ the concept of awe without 
knowing or agreeing upon the conventional defi nition of it, a ‘mixture 
of fear and admiration.’18 Th e distinction between knowing a concept 
implicitly and explicitly does not seem to apply to the concept of a father 
because if we change the explicit account of what we mean by ‘father’ 
(male parent), we also change the concept. Perhaps one wants to draw 
upon this possible limitation of the distinction between implicit and 
explicit knowledge of a concept and claim that the distinction doesn’t 
apply to the God-sortal or the context of religious concepts in general. 
If true, this would entail that the current criticism of soft  contextualism, 
drawing upon this distinction, may not extend to the religious version of 
soft  contextualism currently considered. How, then, can one settle if it 
does apply to the religious case or not? 
Perhaps one can propose that the distinction primarily applies to 
concepts the content of which we may typically be uncertain about, such 
as ‘time’ or ‘personal identity.’ If one accepts this, admittedly imprecise, 
criterion for when the distinction applies, one can argue that the God-
sortal and religious concepts in general are unaff ected by it in virtue of 
not being among the concepts we usually wonder about. Alan Bailey, for 
instance, seems to accept this latter idea.
We normally have no diffi  culty, for example, in telling other people what 
time it is or how much time a particular activity is likely to take. However 
when we stand back from such mundane activities and ask ourselves ‘What 
is time?’, we are suddenly plunged into confusion. In the case of religious 
discourse, though, this phenomenon is almost unknown. If someone who is 
at ease using the word ‘God’ in prayer and catechisms asks ‘What is God?’, 
18 Paul Grice, “Postwar Oxford Philosophy” (1956), in Studies in the Way of Words, 
ed. Paul Grice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 176. 
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that person rarely has any diffi  culty in arriving at an answer with which he 
or she is fairly comfortable.19 
I disagree with Bailey. Just like people will have a hard time, not in saying 
what time it is, but in saying what time is, I think that religious people 
can initially fi nd it easy to talk to or about God, but diffi  cult to make 
sense of the concept of God if asked about it. And even if they are not 
uncertain or confused about what they mean from the outset, it does 
not appear all that diffi  cult to make them wonder about it. Of course, 
we do not seem to be confused or uncertain about the proper content of 
all concepts, but the distinction between confusing and non-confusing 
concepts doesn’t coincide with a distinction between religious and non-
religious concepts. Moreover, it also appears diffi  cult, if not impossible, 
to separate religious and non-religious contexts and concepts. For 
instance, if our concept of time is a confusing one (as Bailey appears 
to think), so must the concept of God (as a being outside time) be. So 
even if people may not be mistaken or ignorant about all concepts they 
employ, this fact would not by itself entail that religious concepts are not 
among the perplexing ones. Th e current criticism of soft  contextualism, 
drawing upon the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, 
thus appears to apply to the notion of a God-sortal and the context of 
religion in general. At least we have seen no reason for why it should not 
be thought to do so. Religious people can thus be mistaken about the 
God-sortal along the general line suggested so far in this section. 
However, the present suggestion about how religious people can be 
wrong concerning the God-sortal may also be used to defend a diff erent 
kind of soft  contextualism, one drawing upon the notion of ‘intuitive 
judgement.’ People within a religion who may be ignorant about the 
proper and implicit content of a religious concept, like the God-sortal, 
can still be held to have an intuitive account of it. One reason for thinking 
so is the following picture of what is going on:
According to a widely held view, when philosophers analyze a concept they 
are seeking an explicit account of the concept’s content – a content that they 
19 Alan Bailey, “Wittgenstein and the Interpretation of Religious Discourse”, in 
Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert L. Arrington et al (London: Routledge, 
2001), 135. 
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already know in some implicit manner. Th is implicit knowledge provides 
the intuitions that guide us in formulating proposed analyses, and allows 
us to recognize counterinstances to these proposals. Our inability simply to 
state the correct analysis is explained by this distinction between the implicit 
knowledge we already have and the explicit knowledge we seek.20
One can, then, argue that when working out an analysis of a certain 
religious concept, one should consider our intuitive judgement about it, 
because this is believed to reveal what we implicitly know about it, and 
what we thus hold ourselves accountable to. One may also claim that it 
would be peculiar if people employing a concept on a regular basis had 
no fi rm and reliable intuition about its proper content. Th at would seem 
peculiar in that our intuitive judgements must have a source. Th ey don’t 
come from nowhere, and it would appear natural to think that when 
we refl ect intuitively about the proper use or content of a concept, what 
we do is to abstract information from our actual employment of it. Th is 
appeal to intuitive judgement would lead us back to a certain kind of 
soft  contextualism, one consisting of the idea that people using a certain 
concept regularly and seriously cannot fail to have a reliable intuitive 
judgement about its proper content. It may not be easy for them to fi gure 
out the proper content, but also not impossible. Interestingly enough, 
the current suggestion also seems to lead back to an ‘individualistic’ kind 
of soft  contextualism in that people’s implicit and intuitive judgements 
do not depend on or defer to someone else within the community they 
belong to. Th e suggestion can also perhaps account for how religious 
people can be justifi ed in opposing Phillips’ account of what they mean: 
Even if they can be wrong about the God-sortal or the grammar for some 
object, they cannot be too wrong about this while being committed to it, 
and the devotee’s intuitive judgement about this determines the extent of 
her commitment, and thus how mistaken she may be. 
Have we, then, fi nally come to the end in our investigation of the 
nature and status of soft  contextualism? Does our intuitive judgement 
about a concept constitute the norm for accurate thinking about it, 
which we hold ourselves committed to and according to which we may 
be wrong? One reason for thinking so is that it appears diffi  cult to go 
20 Harold Brown, “Why Do Conceptual Analysts Disagree?,” Metaphilosophy 30 
(1999): 33.
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beyond intuitive judgement. For instance, even someone arguing for 
the causal theory of reference, and who perhaps claims that what we 
“have in mind” when referring is less important than usually assumed 
for us to be successful in this, may nonetheless be thought to base his 
argument on an intuitive idea about what it is in virtue of which people 
refer to a certain object.21 Th e criticism of a certain religious kind of 
soft  contextualism, the view that people cannot be mistaken about God 
beyond an identifying description of God, may thus depend on the 
accuracy of a diff erent kind of religious soft  contextualism, the view 
that a religious person cannot be mistaken beyond his or her intuitive 
judgement about the God-sortal. We thus appear to have come to the 
end of the road, but in some sense perhaps also just the beginning of it, 
because the notion of intuitive judgement raises many questions. To end 
this article, I only want to point out one of them.
One question concerning this matter is: is an intuitive judgement 
what constitutes the proper content of a concept or is it our evidence 
in fi guring this out? To the extent that we accept the former option, we 
have a reason for thinking that religious people cannot be very wrong 
about what they mean in that what they intuitively judge themselves to 
mean is constitutive of what they mean. One problem with this option 
is that if someone was to change his intuitive judgement, he would then 
automatically change his concept; or if people within the same religious 
tradition were to diff er in what they fi nd intuitively correct, they would, 
it seems, have diff erent concepts. Th is may seem incorrect in that it 
would appear to make conceptual change and diversity all too easy to 
come by. To avoid this outcome, one can soft en the relationship between 
a concept and our intuitive judgement about it by regarding the latter 
as evidence for what we mean by the former; as information in need 
of assessment rather than conclusive and infallible knowledge about 
the concept’s content. However, if we accept this “evidential” reading of 
intuitive judgement, we appear to reopen the matter explored throughout 
this article. Once more we seem to accept that we can be ignorant and 
mistaken about what we mean due to the fact that an intuitive judgement 
is inconclusive or can be interpreted wrongly. If so, then we need to 
21 See for instance Frank Jackson, “Reference and Description Revisited,” Philosophical 
Perspectives 12 (1998): 213 for this idea. 
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examine to what standard an intuitive judgement is accountable and 
according to which it can be judged correct or incorrect. Th is is surely 
an important and interesting question and I hope to be able to return to 
it another time.
Th roughout this article I have sought to show some of the diff erent 
senses in which religious people can be mistaken about what they mean. 
In closing, I should emphasize that I do not, of course, think that I have 
off ered a complete investigation of this matter; much more should be 
said about each of the senses attended to. Nor do I wish to imply that 
only religious people may be mistaken in the senses considered. I do, 
however, consider the religious context as one of the most interesting 
ones, if not even the most interesting one, for pursuing questions about 
the sense in which or the extent to which people can be ignorant about 
what they mean. Hopefully I have made some contribution to showing 
how this can be and why.
